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We analyse the demand for and the supply of night visits in primary care. A
model of demand management by general practitioners and of their choice
between meeting demand by making visits themselves or passing them to
commercial deputising services is presented. Demand and supply equations
are derived and estimated using panel data from English primary care health
authorities over the 1984-1994 period. The introduction of differential fees
for GP and deputy visits in April 1990 led GPs to increase their own visits
and to reduce the number made by deputies. GPs also responded by either
reducing efforts to manage demand downwards or increasing efforts to
induce demand. GPs manage demand downwards in response to exogenous
demand increases.  We also find that demand is not affected by the likelihood
that the visit is made by a GP or a deputy, suggesting that patients do not
perceive these visits as being of differential quality.
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1. Introduction
Out of hours primary care
1 in the English National Health Service (NHS) is provided by a
variety of services and professionals, including general practitioners (GPs), accident and
emergency departments (A&E), ambulance services, evening nurses, social services,
pharmacists and dentists.  GPs and A&E departments are the most important, both in terms of
the  proportion of the total out of hours care provided and resources used.
Certain features of the health care provision of out of hours primary care services in England
make it an interesting setting to explore physician responses to incentives.  First, out of hours
care provided by a practice to its patients is one of the few examples in the NHS of
remuneration on a simple fee for service basis.  Second, patients do not face charges for care
so their demand for night visits from their GPs is not directly affected by changes in the fees
paid to GPs.  Consequently, it may be easier to examine the extent to which doctors influence
the demands made by their patients.  Third, GPs may themselves provide out of hours care for
the patients on their list (being on call during the night or via rotas with other GPs) or they
may pass on the calls from their patients to deputising services.  In the latter case GPs must
then pay the deputy for the out of hours visits made.  Since the supply of visits by GPs can be
less than the number of visits demanded by patients we have further scope for disentangling
demand and supply sides when examining the data generated by the market.
This paper provides a modelling framework to examine factors influencing the supply of and
the demand for out of hours care in primary care.  We use the model to examine the extent to
which it is possible to disentangle supply and demand factors and to guide our estimation of
supply and demand functions in the market for primary care in the NHS using an area level
panel data set for 1984/5-1994/5.  Explicit modelling is essential to understand the data on
demand and supply generated by the market and to assess the impact of policy changes. By
modelling and estimating the demand and supply functions we can address three principal
questions:
• how does the supply of night visits by GPs respond to changes in the fees for night visits?
                                                
1 The definition of out of hours care is, to some extent, arbitrary since surgery hours vary across practices
(Hallam, 1994).  In our empirical work we use the definition adopted by the remuneration system.3
• To what extent do GPs influence the demand for night visits by their patients?
• Do patients appear to care whether night visits are made by their GP or by a deputy?
The effect of the fees paid to GPs on the supply of night visits is of obvious importance for
policy makers attempting to predict the effects of fee changes on NHS expenditure and on the
services provided to patients.  Much of the interest in the extent to which doctors influence the
demand from their patients has focused on the question of whether doctors attempt to increase
patient demand to boost their incomes (Labelle et al, 1994).  However, GPs may also wish to
reduce demand for out of hours visits to patients since these are widely perceived to impose
much heavier costs on GPs than consultations during normal office hours, and in the NHS
doctors do not have the option of rationing demand by raising prices to patients.
In April 1990 the NHS introduced differential payments to GPs for night visits made by the GP
or by a doctor from a deputising service.  This was an explicit attempt to reduce the amount of
night visiting carried out by deputies rather than by patients’ own GPs.  The rationale for the
change was that visits by GPs were thought to be of higher quality than those by deputies,
because the latter would be less well informed about the patient.  However, it is not clear
whether patients share this perception (Dixon and Williams, 1988; McKinley et al., 1997).  We
attempt to provide some indirect evidence by testing whether demand is affected by the
likelihood that a visit is made by a deputy.  If this is not the case, the rationale for differential
payments for visits by GPs and deputies is weakened.
In the next section we describe the organisation of out of hours primary care.  We also discuss
the related literature and distinguish our contribution.  In Section 3 we model a market for
primary care night visits with a demand side in which demand may depend on the proportion of
night visits by deputies and GPs’ demand management and a supply side in which GPs must
decide whether to encourage or discourage demand, and how much demand to meet
themselves and how much from deputies.  We derive comparative static responses to demand
and supply side exogenous variables, including night visit fees and examine the circumstances
in which increases in exogenous demand make GPs worse off.  Section 4 describes the data.
Section 5 estimates the demand and supply equations in the light of the theoretical model and
discusses the result.  Section 6 contains our conclusions.4
2. Out of hours primary care in the NHS
2.1 Background
GPs are  responsible for the primary care of their patients on a 24 hour basis.   Night visits are
one of the few general practice services remunerated on a fee for service basis. A £1 fee per
night visit was introduced in April 1967 (equivalent to £9.39 in 1995 prices).  In subsequent
years the fee increased in real terms and was £20.25 in 1989/90 (£25 in 1995 prices).  The
1990 GP contract introduced two major changes in out of hours remuneration. First, the time
over which visiting fees could be paid was extended from 23.00-7.00 hours to 22.00-8.00
hours.  Second, a differential fee for visits was introduced: a fee of £45.00 was paid for a night
visit by the patient’s GP and a lower fee of £15.00 was paid to the GP if the visit to their
patient was made by a deputy.
Table 1 shows that the national average night visits rate has risen from 43 visits per 10,000
population in 1967 when the £1 fee per visit was introduced (Buxton et al., 1977) to 196.6 in
1989 and 357.5 in the 1994-95 financial year (NHS Executive, 1996).  Even if we allow for the
possibility that GPs did not claim for all visits in the early years of the system when the fee was
very low, the increase is dramatic and has prompted debate as to the extent to which it is due
to patients becoming more demanding or to changes in GPs’ demand management.
Most GPs regard out of hours work as a negative aspect of their medical career (Rowsell,
1995).  Out of hours calls, especially night calls are described as a source of stress and many
feel that family life is constantly interrupted by telephone calls (Rout, 1996).  It is not
surprising that GPs are keen on reducing their personal availability (Scott, 1999) and have used
alternative arrangements for out of hours care delivery (Lattimer et al., 1996).  Especially in
urban areas, where the density of the population made them economical, there was a rapid
growth of deputising services.  The majority of GPs used these commercial services to free
themselves of night work for at least some days of the week (Dopson, 1971).  In more recent
years there has been a growth of co-operatives of GPs to provide out of hours care for their
patients (Hallam and Cragg, 1994).
Table 2 shows the proportion of night visits made by deputising services.  In 1989-90 almost
half of the night visits were made by deputies.  The new remuneration system introduced in
April 1990 discouraged the use of deputising services, and the proportion of night visits made5
by deputies decreased to 30.8% in 1990-91.  Subsequently, the proportion of night visits made
by deputies rose again to 38.5% in 1994-95.
2.2 Previous studies of the market
Previous studies have been almost entirely based on a single cross section, either at practice
level or at area level and have related the rate of night visits to a variety of supply and demand
side variables.  Majeed et al. (1995) analysed the claims for night visits among GPs in Merton,
Sutton and Wandsworth (an area in London) and found that the night visits rate was positively
associated with the proportion of the practice population aged under five years, and the
proportion chronically ill.  Night visits were negatively related to the proportion of the practice
population aged between 35 and 44 years and to list inflation (the difference between the
number of patients on practice lists in an area and the population estimated from the population
census).  Whynes and Baines (1996) examined the variation in night visit rate among practices
in Lincolnshire and found a positive relationship with the number of maternity claims per GP,
the number of patients per GP, the number of home visits per GP, the number of other
practices within a one mile radius, and the unemployment rate.  Carlisle et al. (1993) found that
the variation in night visit rates among different wards within one general practice was
significantly associated with the Jarman and Townsend deprivation scores and unemployment
rates.  Cubitt and Tobias (1983), comparing out of hours calls between two similar practices in
London, found that differences in night visits rates were mainly related to differences in the
doctor’s attitude and response towards minor symptoms.
There have been three studies at the level of the administrative unit for primary care, Family
Health Service Authorities (FHSAs)
2, where data is more readily available.  Buxton et al.
(1977) and Baker and Klein (1991) found that characteristics of FHSAs populations which
were positively associated with night visit rates included the proportion of the population in
lowest social class, the standardised mortality ratios, and the proportion of elderly patients.
Practice characteristics such as the proportion of GPs aged over 65, the ratio of practice nurses
to GPs, and the proportion of practitioners with lists sizes below 1000 patients, were
                                                
2 Before April 1990 the 90 FHSAs, each with around 500,000 patients, were called Family Practitioner
Committees but had the same geographical composition. In what follows references to FHSAs should be
understood to cover FPCs where appropriate. In April 1996 FHSAs were reorganised into 100 new Health
Authorities which combined responsibility for secondary and primary care.6
negatively related with night visiting rates.  Conversely, practice characteristics positively
associated with night visiting rates included the proportion of GPs with permission to use
deputising services.  Baker et al. (1994) compared FHSAs’ night visiting rates, before and after
the change in the contract in April 1990.  The study allowed for the effects of socio-economic
and demographic characteristics of FHSAs by cluster analysis rather than multiple regression.
They found that GPs increased their own night visiting activities and reduced their reliance on
deputising services and these changes varied across clusters.  For example, the increase in the
number of night visits was greatest in the most affluent cluster.
Some of the previous analyses have distinguished between demand and supply factors (Buxton
et al., 1977; Baker et al., 1994).  However, single equation cross section models in which the
night visit rate is regressed on a mixture of variables which might affect supply and demand
side decisions are problematic.  They yield results which are difficult to interpret because they
are derived from a reduced form equation or are biased because of the inclusion of variables,
such as the proportion of GPs with permission to use deputising services, that are potentially
endogenous.
We believe our paper makes a number of contributions to the literature.  We specify a
theoretical model which clearly distinguishes demand and supply sides of the market and derive
comparative static predictions.  Our data is a panel rather than a single cross section and we
get more of the information from the data by using multiple regression rather than cluster
analysis.  The estimations are guided by our formal model.  We show that it is possible to
estimate the structural supply equation and that although it may not be possible to identify the
demand equation we can obtain some guidance as to the likely biases in estimated coefficients.
We also test for demand management by GPs.
3. A model of the market for night visits
3.1 Demand for night visits
The demand for night visits in an area depends on patients’ valuations of the health gains and
thus on characteristics of the population such as age and health status. Patients do not face
charges for night visits but their demand will depend on the costs of alternative sources of out
of hours of care, for example the travelling, waiting and treatment time for a visits to a7
pharmacy or accident and emergency department.  We indicate these exogenous demand
factors by a vector  x.
Demand depends on GPs’ demand management activity  a which will be discussed in the next
section.  Demand may also be affected by whether visits are made by the patient’s GP or a
commercial deputising service.  Patients may place a higher value on visits made by a physician
who knows their health history than on visits made by deputising physicians.  Patients perceive
the quality of night visits  q as depending on the number of visits made by GPs and by deputies
q q g n g = - ( , ) q1 0 > ,  q2 0 < (1)
where  g is the number of visits by GPs and  n is the total number of night visits.
The demand function can be written as
n D x a q = (,,) Dx > 0,  Da<
>0,   Dq > 0 (2a)
or, allowing for (1), as
3
  ) , , ( g a x n n = nx > 0,  na<
>0, 0,  ng > 0 (2b)
3.2 Supply decisions
GPs are constrained to meet the total demand for night visits from their patients but they can
attempt to manage demand positively or negatively.  A practice must also decide how much of
the demand to meet themselves and how much to meet by passing calls onto a deputising
service.  We ignore the distinction between the different means of GPs meeting demand
themselves such as own visits, shared rotas, or joining a cooperative.
GP preferences are described by a utility function  u( p,L,a), where  p is practice income,  L( g) is
leisure and  a is demand management activity.  GP visits reduce leisure but deputy visits do
not: ¢ < L 0.
                                                
3 Using  n - D( x,a,q( g,n - g) = 0 we have  ng =  Dq( q1 - q2)/(1  - Dqq2),  nx =  Dx/(1  -  Dqq2) and  na =  Da/(1  -  Dqq2).8
Passing a call onto a deputising service reduces the net income of the practice.  A visit made by
a deputy attracts a fee for the practice, but the practice must pay the deputising service.  Thus
even when the NHS remuneration regime paid the same fee to the practice irrespective of who
made the visit, the net fee for a visit by a deputy  f
d  was less than the fee for a visit by the
GPf
g.  After 1 April 1990 the fee paid to the practice by the NHS for a deputy visit was
reduced to one third of the fee paid for a visit made by a GP.
Practice income is
p = + - - + gf n g f c n z y
g d ( ) (,) ( 3)
where  c is the practice cost function ( c c n nn > > 0 0 , ),  y is other practice income, and  z is a
vector of exogenous practice characteristics.  Using (2b) the effect of an additional visit by a
GP on practice income is
pg
g d d
n g f f f c n = - + - ( ) (4)
GPs can induce their patients to request more night visits, for example by making it easier to
contact the practice out of hours.  They can also discourage demands by educating patients
about making requests for visits for “trivial” reasons.  Such demand management activity is
costly to GPs whether demand is encouraged or discouraged ( ua < 0).
4
GP and deputy visits cannot be non-negative and must sum to equal demand. Hence the
Lagrangean for the GP’s problem of choosing GP visits and demand management activities is
u n g a x g + - l[( ,,) ]  and the first order conditions are, with complementary slackness:
( ) u u L n g g L g pp l + ¢ + - £ ‡ 1 0 0 , (5)
u f c n u n a
d
n a a a p l ( ) , - + + £ ‡ 0 0 (6)
n x g a g (, ,) , - ‡ ‡ 0 0 l (7)
                                                
4 To be more precise, we should define  a as a vector ( a1, a2) with  a1 being demand reducing activity ( na1 < 0),  a2
being demand inducement activity ( na2 > 0), with the activities being distasteful ( uai  < 0) and mutually
exclusive ( a1a2 = 0).9
Making the appropriate assumptions to ensure the concavity of  u in  g and  a, the first order
conditions define the optimal number of GP visits  g g x z f f
g d * = (,, , )  and the amount of
demand management  a a x z f f
g d * = (,, , ) .  Substituting into the demand function gives the
equilibrium number of visits  n
* =  n( x,g
*,a
*), and visits by deputies  n
* - g
*.  There are nine types
of market equilibrium depending on whether GPs pass all their visits to deputies, do some
visits or do all visits and whether they engage in demand management and if so whether they
induce or reduce demand.
The type of demand management activity undertaken is determined by whether visits are
profitable at the margin.  Suppose that the GP undertakes all visits and does not use the
deputising service so that the constraint  n  ‡  g binds.  Substituting for  l in the condition on  a
and rearranging gives
( ) [ ] u f c u L n u
g
n L a a p - + ¢ + = 0 (7)
If  f
g £ cn the square bracketed term is negative and the GP will only wish to engage in
activities to reduce demand ( na < 0).  Conversely he will only wish to induce demand ( na > 0) if
additional visits are profitable ( f
g >   cn). Whether demand is managed will depend on the
magnitude of  ua( p,L,0).
When the GP makes use of the deputising service to meet demand, the effect of demand
management on utility is  u f c n u
d
n a a p( ) - + .  If  f
d <  cn    the practice will not want to increase
demand and may engage in demand reducing activities. Conversely if  f
d >  cn, inducement
activity ( na > 0) is profitable though it may not be undertaken if highly distasteful at the
margin.
Figure 1 illustrates the decision on how to meet exogenous demand of  n in a simple case in
which demand is not affected by perceived quality and there is no demand management
activity.  If the GP meets all the demand by using deputies he is at  k where  g = 0 and
p = - + y c n f n
d () .  If he meets the demand entirely by GP visits he is at  m where  g =  n and
p = - + y c n f n
g () .  Increases in  g reduce leisure so that GPs’ preferences can be shown in
( g,p) space as indifference curves like I 1.10
In the example shown the GP chooses  b1 on the constraint line  km which has slope  f f
g d - .
With a less strong relative preference for leisure (flatter indifference curves) the optimal point
might be  b2 or even at  m where he meets all demand without using the deputising service.
3.3 Comparative statics
Consider the effect of simultaneous increase in  f
g and reduction in  f
d  (as happened in
1990/1).  The new constraint line in Figure 1 is  k1m1 which cuts the old constraint line  km and
has a steeper slope.  If there is no income effect the GP would increase  g and reduce deputy
visits (as expected by policy makers).  But suppose that leisure is a normal good.  If the GP
was initially at  b2 he is made better off and the income effect will, at least partially, offset the
substitution effect: the GP may reduce the number of visits he makes and pass more calls to his
deputising service.  Conversely, if the GP is initially at  b1 he is made worse off by the fee
changes, the income effect will reinforce the substitution effect and the proportion of visits
made by the GP will increase.
Figure 2 illustrates the effect of an increase in exogenous demand from  n to  n1 when the GP
uses the deputising service to meet part of the demand.  Income when only deputies are used
changes by  f
d ( n1  -  n)  -  Dc and when no deputies are used by  f
g( n1  -  n)  -  Dc, where  Dc =
c( n1)  -  c( n).  The constraint line is shifted up or down by demand increases depending on
whether  f
d  exceeds or is less than the marginal cost of extra night visits.  In the case shown
f c n
d
n < () and the GP is made worse off by the demand increase.  If leisure is a normal good
he will increase the number of visits he makes but the proportion of visits by deputies may
increase or decrease.
We can also make use of Figure 2 to gain some intuition for incentives to engage in demand
management.  Starting from demand of  n, all points to the left of  n have lower incomes when
demand increases if  f c n
d
n < ().  Hence if the initial position is to the left of  m (so that  g < n)
the GP is made worse off by the demand increase.  He will therefore not wish to engage in an
activity (demand inducement) which he dislikes for its own sake and which results in an
unfavourable shift in his income leisure opportunity boundary.  Indeed if demand is initially at
n1 he gets a more favourable income leisure constraint line by managing demand down to  n.  If11
his marginal dislike for demand management is not too great he would be better off by
engaging in demand reduction from  n1 to  n.
If he was initially at  m and meeting all demand himself he may be made better off by the
increase in demand provided that  m1 generates higher income than  m, which requires that
f c n
g
n > ().  When  f c n
g
n > (), GPs who meet all demand without recourse to deputising
services will not wish to discourage demand and may be better off by inducing it.
Definite comparative static predictions require restrictions on the specification of technology,
demand and preferences.  Table 3 reports the effects of changes in demand conditions  x which
increase demand ( nx > 0), the fees  f f
g d ,  paid for night visits and the cost parameter  z which
increase marginal cost ( cnz  > 0  ).  To derive the definite results in the table we assume that GP
preferences are quasi linear in income and additively separable so that there are no income
effects, that there are no quality effects on demand ( ng = 0), and that the effect of demand
management is independent of the level of the demand shift parameters  x ( nxa = 0).
The table shows the effect of increases in the exogenous variables on the number of visits made
by GPs and on the level of demand via demand management  n a k a ¶ ¶  ( k = x, f f
g d , ,  z).
Note that we are interested in the sign of the product   n a k a ¶ ¶  rather than the signs of its
components because we do not observe demand management, only its effects on demand.  The
effect of an exogenous variable on demand via demand management could be positive either
because the practice increases its demand inducement or because it reduces its attempts to
restrain demand.  The table covers the six possible cases in which there is demand management
and, when  n a k a ¶ ¶  is set to zero, the three cases in which there is no management of demand.
We observe the aggregated responses of all practices in an area, rather than individual practices
so that the size of observed response depends on the distribution of practices across the cases.
However, we can make qualitative predictions where the responses in the different cases are of
the same sign or are zero.  Thus we see that exogenous increases in demand will, in aggregate,
increase the number of visits by GPs but lead to a change in demand management which
reduces the impact of the demand increase.  The net effect on demand, allowing for changes in
demand management, is positive but less than the direct effect.  The fact that we cannot
observe demand management activities directly will lead to downward bias on the estimated
effects of exogenous demand shifters on demand.  The intuition for  n a x a ¶ ¶  < 0 when the12
practice is engaged in demand inducement ( na > 0) is that an exogenous increase in demand
enables it to reduce the level of a distasteful activity (demand management):  ¶ ¶ a x < 0.  When
the practice is restraining demand ( na < 0) visits are costly at the margin and the increase in
demand increases the marginal gain from demand reduction and so demand management
increases:  ¶ ¶ a x > 0
The aggregate effect of exogenous increases in marginal cost is intuitive.  With a higher
marginal cost the practice will wish to reduce demand and so will either increase efforts to
reduce demand ( n a z a < > 0 0 , ¶ ¶ ) or reduce efforts to increase it ( n a z a > < 0 0 , ¶ ¶ ).  The
reduced number of night visits will be met either by a reduction in deputy visits (cases ( i) and
( ii)) or a reduction in GP visits (case ( iii)).
Increases in the fee for visits by GPs leads to an increase in the number of visits by GPs in
practices where GPs make at least some visits.  It does not affect the incentives for demand
inducement unless GPs make all visits themselves.  Thus the aggregate effect of the fee
increase is to increase visits by GPs and the management of demand to increase demand.
Increases in the fee for deputy visits have no effect on behaviour where all visits are made by
the GP.  If the GP uses the deputising service to meet some of the demand an increase in the
fee for a deputy visit leads to a change in demand management which results in an increase in
demand.  The number of visits by deputies increases and so does the proportion of visits by
them.
Figure 3 illustrates the impact of the 1990/1 increase in fees for GP visits and reduction in fees
for deputy visits.  A practice initially at m 1 and not using any deputies will be able to move to
m2 with the same demand.  It is even better off managing a demand increase to  n1 and moving
to  m3.  Conversely a practice initially at  b1 is made worse off and would be at  b2 if it made no
response.  It can leave the level of demand unchanged, increase the number of visits made by
GPs and move up the constraint line  b2m2.  By managing a demand reduction to n 2 it may do
even better by shifting the constraint line upwards to  b3m4 so that demand falls and the number
of visits made by GPs increases.  The overall effect of the simultaneous increase in  f
g  and
reduction in  f
d  is to increase the number of visits by GPs.  The effect on the level of demand
is less clear since practices with a low proportion of visits by GPs will manage demand
downwards and those with a high proportion will manage demand upwards.13
3.4 Do demand increases make GPs better off?
In standard industrial economics models increases in the demand makes suppliers better off.
But GPs have been complaining for many years about increasing demand from their patients
for out of hours visits (Rivett, 1998, p. 412).  We can use the model to explain this apparent
paradox as arising from the facts that GPs must meet demand and have no ability to raise fees
to patients as an alternative means of choking off demand.
The marginal effect of an increase in the demand shift parameter on the GP’s maximised utility







u f c n n
d
n x x = - + (8)
In the case in which a GP does not make all the night visits ( g <  n) the GP is worse off if the
net fee for a deputy visit is less than the marginal cost of a visit since the Lagrange multiplier is
zero and  up > 0,  nx > 0.  If the GP does not use deputies the constraint  n  ‡  g binds and  l  > 0
so that the second term is negative.  If the GP does not engage in any demand management
activity the effect of demand increases is ambiguous.  In terms of Figure 2 he moves from  m to
m1 and  m1 may be above or below the indifference curve through  m.  If the GP does manage










a = - (9)
Now  ua  < 0 and so we have the intuitive result that the GP is made worse off by the increase
in demand if he is already attempting to manage demand downwards ( na < 0).  Conversely, a
GP who is inducing demand ( na > 0) is made better off by demand increase.   Hence we see
that the model predicts that GPs may indeed be made worse off as demand increases.
4. Data
The data used are from the Health Service Indicators (HSI) database (NHS Executive, several
years) and cover 11 financial years (April to March) from 1984/5 to 1994/5.  The unit of
analysis is the FHSA.14
The night visits rate,  nit, is expressed as the annual night visits rate per 10,000 population.
From April 1990 the period over which visiting fees could be paid increased from 23.00-7.00
hours to 22.00-8.00 hours.  We therefore follow Buxton et al. (1977) and adjust the number of
night visits to allow for the change in the number of hours for which visit fees could be
claimed.  The effect of the adjustment is scale down the number of night visits from 1990/1
onwards.
The exogenous population characteristics  xit are the proportions of FHSA population aged 0-4
and aged 75 or older, and the age and sex standardised mortality rate.  Increases in the
proportion of the FHSA population aged 5 or younger, aged 75 or older and in the
standardised mortality rate are expected to increase the number of night visits demanded.  We
also include the pharmacy density (measured by the ratio between the number of community
pharmacies and the FHSA area) to allow for differences in the accessibility to alternative
sources of out of hours care.  We expect density of community pharmacies to be negatively
associated with demand for night visits.
We use the proportion of visits by deputies as a measure of the quality of night visits and
expect that increases in the proportion reduce demand.  Before 1990/1 night visits by deputies
were remunerated at the same rate as visits by GPs and consequently data on deputy visits was
collected only biannually and some areas did not collect the information at all (see Table 2).
Regressions including our measure of quality are therefore based on 691 rather than 990
observations.
The supply of visits by GPs g it is expressed as the number of night visits exclusively made by
GPs per physician (adjusted by the number of hours over which fees were paid).
The exogenous primary practice care characteristics  zit are the ratio of practice nurses to GPs,
the proportion of GPs who are solo practitioners, the proportion of GPs older than 65, the
number of GPs per head of the population and the population density.  We expect that a higher
ratio of practice nurses to GPs will leave GPs free to make more night visits.  Single handed
GPs may have higher costs of making night visits since they cannot organise rotas with their
partners.  We also expect older GPs to find night visits more of a strain and to make fewer of
them.  GPs in areas with higher population density are expected to make more visits because of15
lower travel and time costs.  Finally, we anticipate that GPs with smaller list sizes will be less
busy during office hours and be more willing to make out of hours visits.
Night visit fees are fixed centrally by the Department of Health and do not vary across areas.
GPs are influenced both by the level of the fees for night visits but also by the relative size of
the fees for visits by deputies and GPs.  There was no difference in the fees prior to 1990/1 and
after 1990/1 the ratio of GP visit fee to deputy visit fee was kept close to 3.  Consequently the
correlation between the fees paid to GPs and deputies is extremely high (0.9985).  Further, the
large change in the relative sizes of the fees occurred at the same time (April 1990) as the large
increase in the fee paid for GP visits. We could not satisfactorily disentangle the effects of the
change in the level and the ratio of the fees and in the estimated equations we include only the
fee for night visits f
g.
5
We include time trends in the estimated demand and supply equations to pick up the effects of
gradually evolving influences which we are not able to measure (such as changes in patient
preferences or GP attitudes).  Table 4 has descriptive statistics of all variables included in the
analysis.
5. Estimation results: supply of night visits by GPs
The model of GP behaviour developed in the section 3 yields the optimal supply of GP visits
and GP demand management as functions of exogenous variables affecting demand by patients,
characteristics of GPs and their practices, and the fees for night visits by GPs and deputies:
g g x z f f
g d * = (,, , ) ,  a a x z f f
g d * = (,, , ) .  We do not have data on demand management
activities but we can estimate the supply function for GP night visits.  We do however test for
demand management activities in our estimation of the demand equation and the effects of the
1990/1 fee changes (see section 6.5).
To choose the functional form of the supply function we compared linear and the log-linear
specifications using the Box-Cox (1962) and the PE tests (Mackinnon et al., 1983).  The Box-
Cox test rejected both specifications, but the  c
2(1) statistics of the linear form was much
                                                
5 Hughes and Yule (1992) encountered similar problems analysing the effects of changes in fees on the
numbers of maternity care and cervical cytology treatments.  We found that using the ratio of GP to deputy visit
fees gave very similar results to using the GP visit fee.16
smaller than for the log-linear case: 55.79 versus 409.99.  The PE test accepts the linear
specification but rejects the log-linear specification.  We accordingly preferred the linear
specification.  We also tested for a structural break in 1990/1 by running separate regressions
without the fee variable for the period before and after April 1990 and found that the estimated
coefficients did not differ significantly.
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Table 5 reports the results for the supply equation
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in which the supply of night visits in FHSA  i at time  t is a function of exogenous characteristics
of the providers  zi , exogenous characteristics of the population and of the area  xit , the GP
night visits fee f
g and time trends.
As the data consist of pooled cross-sectional annual observations over time we use panel data
estimators.  We allow for omitted time-invariant variables that are specific to individual FHSAs
by using a fixed effects estimator (Baltagi, 1995).  Although a fixed effects model sacrifices a
large number of degrees of freedom, the Hausman (1978) test suggests that the alternative
random effects model is not appropriate because the FHSA effects are correlated with time
varying area variables.
The results suggest that the demand side characteristics are important in determining the night
visits supplied by GPs, although the signs of the demand coefficients vary.  For instance we
observe that the proportion of children and aged 75 or older is positively related with the night
visits supplied, while the coefficient on the SMR is negative.  This does not in itself imply that
the model is inappropriate since it is only versions of the theoretical model with restrictions on
preferences or technology that predict that all demand characteristics will have the same
qualitative effect on the supply of night visits by GPs.  However the RESET test suggests that
the regression is misspecified.
                                                
6 The null hypothesis that the coefficients estimated in the two periods were not systematically different was not
rejected by a Hausman test:  c
2(9) = 9.74,  p. = 0.372.17
As a possible solution to the misspecification we can replace the individual demand
characteristics with a variable derived from them.  Consider a model in which the proportion of
visits by deputies does not affect demand (which we find in section 6 is the preferred demand
model).  For given  a demand is fixed and the optimal supply of GP visits conditional on  a is
g z n a x f a
g o(,(,), ,) .  We can estimate
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OLS is not a suitable estimator for (11) because actual demand  nit
g is endogenous and
correlated with unobserved demand management activities.  We estimate (11) using IV with
exogenous demand side variables used as instruments for the potentially endogenous actual
demand variable.
7
Table 6 presents the parameter estimates of the supply equation and compares the OLS results
with those from the IV estimation.  The exogeneity test indicates that the IV estimator is
preferable to OLS.  The signs of most of the estimated coefficients are in line with the
expectations.  Only the coefficient of the variable measuring the ratio between practice nurses
and GPs has an unexpected negative sign.
Comparing the estimated coefficient for the variable measuring the demand for night visits per
GP, we notice that the coefficient estimated using IV is significantly larger than the one
obtained using OLS.  We can interpret this as evidence that GPs manage patients’ demand
downward in response to an exogenous increase in demand.  The OLS coefficient measures the
effect on physicians’ supply of night visits of an exogenous increase in demand after
physicians’ have managed patients’ demand.  The OLS coefficient picks up both the direct
effect of the exogenous demand change and the effect of demand management.  The IV
estimate gives the effect of an increase in the demand after we have purged the management
                                                
7 We have selected the relevant instruments using two criteria: first to maximise the F-statistic of the
identifying instruments in the first stage regressions (see Bound et al., 1995; and Staiger and Stock 1997);
second, to pass the overidentifying (OID) restrictions test, also known in the literature as Sargan-Hansen-
Newey or  J-tests (see Godfrey and Hutton, 1994). Using this procedure we used as instruments the proportion
of the population aged 4 or less, aged 75 or more and pharmacy density. The first stage F-statistic was F(3,590)
= 7.94 and the OID restrictions test was not significant.18
effect.  Since the IV coefficient is larger than the OLS one, we argue that physicians respond
to upward demand shocks by managing demand downwards.
6. Demand for night visits
In the theoretical model of section 3 we considered the implication of patient demand
depending on the proportion of visits by deputies, as a measure of perceived quality, and on
GPs’ demand management. This has implications for the way in which the demand function
should be estimated and we explore these by reporting the results of four types of demand
specifications.
Model 1 assumes demand is entirely exogenous,  Model 2 has demand affected by the
proportion of visits made by deputies,  and Model 3 has demand affected by demand
management.  Model 4 allows for both demand management and endogenous quality.
The Box-Cox (1962) and the PE tests (Mackinnon et al., 1983) of functional form are
inconclusive. The RESET test suggests that the linear models suffer from serious miss-
specification.  We therefore chose the log-linear form which passed the specification test in
most of the models.
6.1 Model 1: Exogenous demand
The simplest specification of the demand equation assumes that the demand is exogenous and
is not influenced by GPs, either directly via demand management or indirectly by their decision
on how much of demand to meet by using deputising services.  The empirical specification is
ln n x t t e it k
k
K
itk it = + + + +




Demand for night visits in FHSA  i at time  t is a function of exogenous characteristics of the
population and of the area  xit  and a time trends.
The first two columns of Table 7 show the exogenous demand equation estimated using all the
990 observations available.  The second part of the table present the same model estimated on
only the 691 observations for which there was information on the number of night visits by
deputies.  The latter results can be compared more directly with the specifications in which the19
proportion of visits by deputies is included as a quality measure.  The estimates are not greatly
affected by the number of observations.  The Hausman tests show that the fixed effects models
are better specifications than the random effects models and the F-tests on the FHSA specific
effects show that panel data models are superior to a simple pooled regressions.
The coefficients on the  xit are biased estimates of the effects of  xit on demand because of
unobserved demand management  a( x,z,f).  There are two problems.  First, the theoretical
model shows that increases in demand may lead GPs to manage demand downwards or reduce
attempts to increase demand.  Hence the coefficients on  xit are biased downwards, although the
theoretical model (see Table 3) suggests that this source of bias will not lead to the coefficients
having the wrong sign.  Second, demand management activities are affected by supply side
characteristics  z which may be correlated  with  x.  The overall effect is indeterminate
theoretically since it depends on the correlations of  z and  x and the strength of the effect of  z
on  a.
The signs of the estimated coefficients on the  xit are in line with our expectations about their
effects on demand when demand management is held constant.  Increases in the proportion of
the population aged 4 or less, aged 75 or more and in standardised mortality are positively
associated with increases in night visits rate.  Increases in the accessibility of community
pharmacies are associated with a significant reduction in the demand of night visits.
6.2 Model 2: Patient demand and quality
We next test whether demand is affected by the proportion of visits made by deputies.  The
demand equation is
ln n x Q t t e it k
k
K
itk q it it = + + + + +




where  Qit is the proportion of visits by deputies.  The coefficient of  Qit is expected to be
negative if patients believe that deputy visits are lower quality.  Since  Qit is determined by GPs’20
decisions, its inclusion in the demand equation creates simultaneous equation bias and the
demand equation cannot be estimated consistently with OLS.
8
Table 8 compares the results when the demand equation is estimated with OLS and
Instrumental Variables (IV) using exogenous supply side variables as instruments.
9 The
Davidson and MacKinnon (1993, pp. 236-242) exogeneity test clearly indicates that OLS is an
inconsistent estimator.
The OLS procedure gives an implausible positive and significant coefficient on the proportion
of night visits made by deputies.  Using IV the coefficient is still positive, though not
statistically significant.  Patients do not appear to care sufficiently about who makes night visits
for this to affect demand.
6.3 Model 3: Demand management
When demand is affected directly by GP behaviour, though not by perceived quality, the
demand function is  ) , , ( )) , , ( , ( f z x n f z x a x n n
* = = .  Since we cannot observe demand
management we must estimate the reduced form demand equation  n x z f
*(,, ) by including the
supply side factors  z and  f.  The coefficients on the demand characteristics  x will reflect the
combined effect of  x on demand and the indirect effect of  x via the impact of  x on the amount
of demand management.  The empirical specification of the demand equation is
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Supply side variables included in the model ( zit) are the availability of practice nurses, the
proportion of GPs solo practitioner, the proportion of GPs aged 65 or older, the number of GP
per population, and the population density and the night visits fee 
g f .
Table 9 presents the results of the estimated regression.  To allow for comparison with the
other models we report both the estimates obtained using all the 990 observations available and
                                                
8 In terms of the theoretical model we have assumed that quality  q = - Q where  Q is measured negatively by
Q=1- g/n. We wish to estimate the demand function  n = D( x,q)  = D( x,- Q)  but must allow for the fact that  g =
g
* = g( x,z,f) so that  Q is correlated with the errors (unobserved components of  x) in  D( .).21
using only the 691 observations for which there is information about the proportion of night
visits made by deputies.  The demand side coefficients are all significant and have the expected
sign.
The theoretical model suggests that the estimated coefficients on the demand factors in both
Model 1 and Model 3 are biased because of unobserved demand management.  Model 3 differs
from Model 1 in including supply side characteristics so that the estimated Model 3 coefficients
on  xit are subject only to the downward bias arising from the effects of  xit on demand
management.  As we noted in the discussion of Model 1 we cannot  a priori predict the
direction of bias induced by the omission of the supply side characteristics and hence the
difference in the coefficients on  xit between the two models is also theoretically indeterminate.
Although the coefficients on the  xit in Model 1 are on the whole somewhat smaller than those
in Model 3 the differences are not statistically different, suggesting that the effect of supply
variables on demand management is small.
Previous single equation single cross section models of the night visit rate (Buxton et al., 1977;
Baker and Klein, 1991) have in effect adopted the reduced form specification of Model 3 and
the results obtained are broadly in line with our panel data results.  We expect that increases in
the supply characteristics which raise the marginal cost of making night visits will lead to
attempts by GPs to manage demand downwards.  Conversely if the characteristics reduce
marginal cost.  The coefficients on the supply characteristics in Model 3 have the expected sign
and are jointly statistically significant.
10   For example, we expect that single handed GPs will
have higher costs of making night visits and areas with a higher proportion of such GPs will
have more effort to manage demand downward so that the negative coefficient on this variable
is in accordance with our predictions.  Table 3 shows that the predicted effects of the GP visit
fee leads GPs to change their demand management activities so that demand increases and the
coefficient on the GP visit fee has the expected positive sign and is significant.
                                                                                                                                                      
9 The selected instruments for the IV estimation were the proportion of GPs aged 65 or older and the proportion
of GPs who had consent to use deputising services.
10  The diagnostic statistics are satisfactory. The RESET test did not suggest misspecification. The Hausman test
showed that the fixed effects model was preferred to the random effects model and the F-test on the FHSAs
specific effects showed the need for a panel data model rather than pooled OLS.22
6.4 Model 4: Endogenous quality and demand management
We now allow both for the possibility of physicians’ demand inducement and for demand being
affected by who is expected to make the visit:
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As in the estimation of Model 2, OLS may suffer from endogenity bias due to the simultaneity
of the variable measuring the proportion of night visits made by the deputising services and an
IV estimator should be used.  Some problem arise in finding suitable instruments as supply side
variables already included in the structural equation cannot be used as instruments for the
potentially endogenous quality variable.  The instruments used in the IV estimation were the
proportion of GPs who were dispensing doctors and the proportion of GPs who had consent
to use deputising services.  In the procedure to select the best set of instruments, the resulting
first stage F-statistic was F(2, 590) = 9.63. The OID restriction test was passed comfortably.
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Table 10 reports the OLS and IV estimates.  The F-statistics for joint inclusion of the supply
side variables is highly significant, confirming that demand is affected by supply side factors.
As in Model 2, the coefficient of the variable measuring the proportion of night visits made by
deputising services in the OLS equation has a significant and positive sign.  With IV estimation
the coefficient is still positive but smaller and does not approach significance.
Comparison of the four models suggests that quality, as measured by the proportion of visits
made by deputies, is not a significant factor in patient demand for night visits but that including
supply variables to pick up some of the unobserved effects of demand management activities
by GPs is sensible.  The reduced form demand Model 3 is to be preferred to the structural
Model 1.
6.5 Further evidence for demand management
We cannot observe demand management directly but our theoretical model suggests that it will
be affected by the fees paid for GP and deputy visits.  Because of the correlation of the23
changes in the GP and deputy visit fees we did not include both fees in our models of supply
and demand.  However, we can use the dramatic increase in GP visit fees and reduction in
deputy visit fees in April 1990 to test for the effect of fees on demand management by
examining the change in demand between 1989/90 and 1990/1.  Reference to the comparative
static predictions in Table 3 shows that practices with a lower proportion of visits by deputies
are more likely to manage demand upwards after the change in fees and that practices with a
higher proportion of deputy visits are more likely to respond by managing demand downwards.
Table 11 reports attempts to test this prediction.  We first examined the relationship between
the change in the total number of night visits between 1989/90 and 1990/1 and the proportion
of practices in an area in 1989/90 which had permission to use a deputising services ( dit-1).  We
include the changes in all the supply and demand characteristics in the regression to allow for
changes in the other factors affecting demand directly or indirectly through demand
management.  The equation is a first differenced form of the reduced form of Model 3 with an
additional variable  dit-1 intended to measure the proportion of practices which are more likely
to respond to the fee changes by attempting to manage demand downwards:
D D D n d x z e i t t t k
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where,  Dxik(t,t-1)  represents the difference in the value of variable  x in the FHSA  i between the
financial years  t (1990/91) and  t  - 1 (1989/90).  The change in fees does not vary across areas
and its effect is picked up in the intercept
The highly significant negative coefficient on  dit-1 provides strong support for the prediction
that fee changes have led GPs either to induce demand or to cut back on attempts to reduce
demand.  To save space we do not report the coefficients on the intercept (highly positively
significant) or the differenced variables (insignificant).  We also estimated the same differenced
equation replacing  dit-1 with measures based on the proportion of visits made by deputising
services in 1989/90.  The results again support the argument and indicate that the relationship
is non-linear.
                                                                                                                                                      
11  The F-statistics in the first stage regression shows that the identifying instruments are weaker than the ones
used in estimating Model 2.  This fact may explain why the exogeneity test is not statistically significant
(Bound et al., 1995; Staiger and Stock, 1997).24
7. Conclusions
We have presented a formal but simple model of the market for night visits in general practice
and shown that it is important to base empirical analysis of the market on an explicit model
both to guide the estimation and to aid in the interpretation of the results.  In addition to
estimating the effects of socio-economic, demographic variables and the characteristics of
general practices we were able to address three issues of importance to policy.
First, we found clear evidence that the GPs respond to financial incentives.  The 1990/1
increase in fees for night visits by GPs and the reduction in the fee for a visit by a deputy led to
large increases in the number of visits by GPs and reductions in visits by deputies.  Our results
support and extend earlier analyses of the fee changes by allowing in a more systematic fashion
for possible confounding by changes in other factors and for the simultaneity of demand and
supply.
Second, our results show that GPs actively manage the demand from their patients rather than
passively meeting it.  We found some evidence that exogenous increases in demand appear to
lead GPs to manage demand downwards and strong signs that the 1990/1 fee changes led them
either to relax efforts to restrain demand or to induce it.
Our third finding of potential policy relevance concerns the rationale for the introduction of
differential fees for visits by GPs and by deputies that deputy visits are of lower quality.  A
recent randomised controlled trial (McKinley et al., 1997) found evidence that deputising
doctors gave telephone advice less readily, take longer to visit at home and have patterns of
prescribing that may be less discriminating than practice doctors (Cragg et al.,  1997).  Patients
were also more satisfied with the out of hours care provided by practice doctors than with that
provided by deputising services (though there were no significant differences in health
outcomes between the two services).  However, it is not clear that patients view deputy visits
as lower quality.  Dixon and Williams (1988) suggested that the large majority of patients were
satisfied with the deputising service they received.  Scott et al. (1998) found that the most
important attribute of out of hours care was for patient “whether the doctor seems to listen”,
followed by the location of the visit.  Whether the patient was seen by a GP from their practice
did not appear to matter.  We found that the demand is not significantly affected by the
proportion of visits made by deputies.  This provides some support for those who argue that
patients are not greatly concerned about who makes out of hours visits.  Policy makers may be25
correct in viewing deputy visits as of lower quality but patients do not seem to care sufficiently
to let it affect the number of night visits they demand.
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Figure 1 Effect of changes in night visits fees
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Figure 2 Effect of increase in demand
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Table 1 Night visit rate per 10,000 population
Financial year Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
1967 
a 43 - - -
1984-85 153.38 35.55 60.50 245.07
1985-86 166.50 40.69 61.39 291.25
1986-87 165.60 37.49 65.27 266.91
1987-88 174.50 43.04 74.11 336.00
1988-89 188.49 48.37 76.58 362.90
1989-90 196.56 49.55 88.87 366.46
1990-91 259.85 66.16 67.96 460.97
1991-92 348.80 77.55 157.37 602.30
1992-93 341.75 79.56 142.31 592.49
1993-94 376.51 81.20 109.30 646.75
1994-95 357.49 73.28 159.77 573.54
Source: Health Services Indicators (NHS Executive, 1996).
a: Source Buxton et al. (1977).29
Table 2 Proportion of night visits made by deputising services
Financial year Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Number of
observation
1984-85 - - - - 0
1985-86 0.471 0.341 0 0.980 84
1986-87 - - - - 0
1987-88 0.456 0.340 0 0.959 73
1988-89 - - - - 0
1989-90 0.486 0.336 0 0.987 84
1990-91 0.308 0.246 0 0.897 90
1991-92 0.327 0.240 0 0.806 90
1992-93 0.323 0.234 0 0.742 90
1993-94 0.349 0.228 0 0.727 90
1994-95 0.385 0.219 0 0.747 90
Source: Health Services Indicators (NHS Executive, 1996).
Table 3 Comparative static properties
Demand Fees Marginal cost
k =  x k =  f 
g k =  f 
d k =  z,  cnz > 0
Case ( i):  g = 0
¶g / ¶k 0 0 0 0
na ¶a / ¶k - 0 + -
nx + na ¶a / ¶x > 0
Case ( ii): 0 <  g <  n
¶g / ¶k 0 + - 0
na ¶a / ¶k - 0 + -
nx + na ¶a / ¶x > 0
Case ( iii):  g =  n
¶g / ¶k + + 0 -
na ¶a / ¶k - + 0 -
nx + na ¶a / ¶x > 0
Assumes  u is additively separable in  p,  L,  a; linear in  p; no quality effects on demand ( na = 0)30
Table 4 Descriptive statistics
Notation Name Description Mean St.Dev Min Max No. of
observations
nit=( vit /popit)/ ht Night visit rate Night visits per 10,000 population, corrected by  ht 27.188 9.255 6.796 64.675 990
xit % of children Proportion of HA population aged 0-4 6.567 0.587 4.573 9.027 990
xit % of 75 or older Proportion of HA population aged 75 or older 6.742 1.212 4.484 11.866 990
xit SMR Standardised mortality rate age 5-64 102.07812.329 65.944136.780 990
xit Pharmacy density Ratio between community pharmacies and HA area in
'000 hectares
4.718 7.794 0.105 68.262 990
zit GPs per capita Number of GPs per ‘000 population0.526 0.039 0.432 0.697 990
zit Nurse/GP Ratio between nurse practitioners and GPs 0.212 0.132 0 0.770 990
zit % solo GP Proportion of GPs solo practitioner 10.956 6.878 0 37.100 990
zit % GP 65 or older Proportion of GPs older than 65 3.367 3.107 0 22.570 990
zit Population density Ratio between population and HA area in hectares 17.722 20.000 0.599 100.762 990
f 
g
t GP night visit fees Fee for night visit made by GP (discounted to Jan 1995
using the purchasing power parities)
22.663 7.791 15.13 31.94 990
Qit % deputising visits Percentage of night visits made by deputising services 0.385 0.282 0 0.987 691
git GPs night visits per GP Night visits made by GPs per GP, corrected by  ht 3.374 1.642 0.067 7.745 691
n
g
it =( vit /GPit)/ ht Night visits rate per GP Total number of  night visits per GP, corrected by  ht 5.187 1.774 1.085 12.449 990
dit % GP with deputy Proportion of GPs who had consent to use deputising
services
55.924 34.748 0 100 900
Instruments% dispensing GPProportion of GPs who were dispensing doctors 11.093 14.268 0 55.215 990
vit: number of night visit fees claimed in FHSA  i in year  t;  popit: population in FHSA  i in year  t;  GPit: number of GPs in FHSA  i in year  t;  ht: number of hours over
which visiting fees could be paid at year  t.31
Table 5 Estimates of the supply equation with demand side factors
Variable Coefficients Standard  Error
GP night visit fee  0.078
*** 0.008
Nurse/GP  0.132 0.541
% solo GP -0.010 0.013
% GP 65 or older -0.039
** 0.023
GPs per capita -0.822 2.471
Population density -0.020 0.088
% of children  0.939
*** 0.243



















F-test (fixed effects   = 0) 12.46
***
Number of observations 691
***   p  £ 0.01; 
**  0.01 <  p  £ 0.05;
 *  0.05 <  p  £ 0.1
Dependent variable: GPs night visits per GP  git
Table 6 Estimates of the supply equation with aggregate demand
OLS IV
Variable Coefficients Standard  Error Coefficients Standard  Error
GP night visit fee  0.076
*** 0.007  0.058
*** 0.011
Nurse/GP -0.122 0.525 -1.542
** 0.817
% solo GP -0.002 0.012 -0.011 0.016
% GP 65 or older -0.050
** 0.021 -0.075
*** 0.027
GPs per capita  0.608 2.345  1.381 2.877
Population density -0.113 0.070  0.033 0.100
Night visits rate per GP  0.292
*** 0.035  0.882
*** 0.214
Time -0.029 0.060  0.002 0.074
Time
2  0.004 0.004 -0.010 0.006
Intercept  1.591 1.865 -5.242
** 2.727
R










OID restrictions test  c
2(2) 0.695
1
st  stage F-test 7.94
***
Number of observations 691 691
***   p  £ 0.01; 
**  0.01 <  p  £ 0.05;
 *  0.05 <  p  £ 0.1
Dependent variable: ln( git)
The instruments used in the IV estimation are the proportions of the population aged 4 or less, aged 75 or
more, and pharmacy density.32
Table 7 Estimates of the demand equation: Model 1 - exogenous demand
Variable Coefficients Standard  Error Coefficients Standard  Error
% of children  0.112
*** 0.031  0.202
*** 0.049
% of 75 or older  0.164
*** 0.024  0.175
*** 0.037
SMR  0.007





Time -0.008 0.009 -0.023 0.016
Time
2  0.005
*** 0.001  0.006
*** 0.001
Intercept  0.535 0.275 -0.108 0.415
R






F-test (fixed effects   = 0) 14.23
*** 8.62
***
Number of observations 990 691
***   p  £ 0.01; 
**  0.01 <  p  £ 0.05;
 *  0.05 <  p  £ 0.1
Dependent variable: ln( nit)
Table 8 Estimates of the demand equation: Model 2 - endogenous quality
OLS  IV
Variable Coefficients Standard  Error Coefficients Standard  Error
% of children  0.283
*** 0.047  0.208
*** 0.059
% of 75 or older  0.190
*** 0.035  0.176
*** 0.038
SMR  0.004





% deputising visits  0.342
*** 0.042  0.025 0.143
Time -0.022 0.015 -0.023 0.016
Time
2  0.006
*** 0.001  0.006
*** 0.001
Intercept -0.439 0.396  0.314 0.447
R









OID restrictions test  c
2(1)  0.04
1
st  stage F-test 30.31
***
Number of observations 691 691
***   p  £ 0.01; 
**  0.01 <  p  £ 0.05;
 *  0.05 <  p  £ 0.1
The instruments used in the IV estimation are the proportion of GP aged 65 or older and the proportion of GP
who had consent to use deputising services.
Dependent variable: ln( nit)33
Table 9 Estimates of the demand equation: Model 3 - demand management
Variable Coefficients Standard  Error Coefficients Standard  Error
% of children  0.089
*** 0.032  0.165
*** 0.050
% of 75 or older  0.132
*** 0.027  0.156
*** 0.041
SMR  0.008





GP per capita  0.838
** 0.354  1.408
*** 0.504
GP night visit fee  0.005
*** 0.001  0.005
*** 0.002
Nurse/GP  0.214
** 0.090  0.293
*** 0.110
% solo GP -0.004
** 0.002 -0.003 0.003
% GP 65 or older  0.001 0.003 -0.002 0.005






*** 0.001  0.007
*** 0.001
Intercept  0.328 0.411 -0.912 0.617
R




RESET  1.41  1.06








F-test ( GP night visit fee,




Number of observations 990 691
***   p  £ 0.01; 
**  0.01 <  p  £ 0.05;
 *  0.05 <  p  £ 0.1
Dependent variable: ln( nit)34
Table 10 Estimates of the demand equation: Model 4 - endogenous quality and
demand management
OLS  IV
Variable Coefficients Standard  Error Coefficients Standard  Error
% of children  0.239
*** 0.046  0.222
*** 0.060
% of 75 or older  0.156
*** 0.037  0.156
*** 0.037
SMR  0.004





GP per capita  0.986
** 0.462  1.083
** 0.514
GP night visit fee  0.010
*** 0.001  0.009
*** 0.003
Nurse/GP  0.199
** 0.101  0.221
* 0.113
% solo GP -0.002 0.002 -0.002 0.003
% GP 65 or older -0.008
* 0.004 -0.007 0.005
Population density  0.024 0.016  0.024 0.016
% deputising visits  0.462






*** 0.001  0.007
*** 0.001
Intercept -0.953
* 0.563 -0.323 0.479
R













F-test ( GP night visit fee,




Exogeneity test -0.110 0.247
OID restrictions test  c
2(1)  0.35
1
st  stage F-test  9.17
***
Number of observations 691 691
***   p  £ 0.01; 
**  0.01 <  p  £ 0.05;
 *  0.05 <  p  £ 0.1
The instruments used in the IV estimation are the proportion of GPs who were dispensing doctors and the
proportion of GPs who had consent to use deputising services.
Dependent variable: ln( nit)
Table 11 Evidence for demand management




% of GPs in 1989/90 with consent to use deputies    -35.276
*** 12.320
% of visits by deputies in 1989/90 -1704.65 1509
% of visits by deputies in 1989/90  8465.78
* 4540
(% of visits by deputies in 1989/90)
2 -11674.12
** 4934
F-test of joint significance [F(2,72)]       3.48
**
Dummy = 1 if  q8990  > 50%, 0 otherwise -1541.03 940
Dummy = 1 if  q8990  > 70%, 0 otherwise -2069.21
** 1005
Dummy = 1 if  q8990  > 80%, 0 otherwise -2462.99
** 1021
***  indicates  p  £ 0.01; 
**  indicates 0.01 <  p  £ 0.05;
 *  indicates 0.05 <  p  £ 0.1
a regressions also included changes in all supply side ( Dzit ) and demand side ( Dx it )characteristics
q8990  = % of visits by deputies in 1989/90;
Dependent variable:  D night visits rate =  ni1990/1  -  ni1989/90 .